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1 February 1964 25X1

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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*South Vietnam: Initial public reaction to the
30 January coup appears mixed

[Saigon is quiet with apparent tacit acceptance of
the coup but no open demonstrations of public enthu-
siasm]

[Reports from the northern city of Hué indicate
some positive and some negative response, with most
of the people taking a "wait and see" attitude. Support
for the change is based on concern over the progress
of the war and fear of neutralism. Criticism stems
from the considerable popularity of the deposed junta
leaders and some feeling, particularly among Bud-
dhists and students, that the change is a reversion to
the policies of the Diem regime]

[The American consul in Hué reports that the coup
has shaken the confidence of many people in the ability
of the military to develop a strong, stable and popu-
lar government to oppose the Viet Cong]

[The mixed reaction of the civilian populace to the
coup may have a counterpart among the military, al-
though there is no known countercoup activity.

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[] Except for
former junta chairman General "Big" Minh, the arrested
generals are reported to have been transferred to the
port of Danang in the north

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*France: A major aim in De Gaulle's press conference yesterday was to induce Taipei to withdraw its claim to represent China in Paris.

While he stressed his high regard for Chiang Kai-shek as a person, he nevertheless emphasized the de facto control Peiping has exerted for fifteen years over "almost the whole of China." His intent was probably to set the stage for a demarche he reportedly plans to make to Chiang.

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[redacted] the Chinese Nationalist chargé d'affaires is to be informed that his government cannot claim to represent China, but that De Gaulle is willing to maintain relations with Chiang sui generis through the chargé.

By referring to Peiping's control over "almost the whole of China" he accepted the contention of both Peiping and Taipei that Taiwan is part of China. He thereby implicitly accepted Peiping's claim to the island, particularly since French Foreign Ministry spokesmen have stressed the indivisibility of sovereignty in explaining that Paris could not recognize both Chinese claimants as representative.

De Gaulle discounted the possibility of early economic return from closer French-Chinese relations. He laid great stress, however, on the outlook for French technological assistance, professing to see in China an infinite field for France's growing technology.

[redacted]


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Congo: [Rebel operations in Kwilu Province apparently are well planned and continue to intensify]

[Following a visit to the area on 30 January, Ambassador Gullion suggested that the rebels' methods and strategy are more sophisticated than anything previously seen in the Congo]

[He noted that the rebellion is not a military threat to the government now, but he believes it is likely to spread. The rebels, who have captured a few small arms, are already active in part of neighboring Kwango Province to the south.]

[There are some 300 government troops in the area, but their control does not extend much beyond the principal towns. Reinforcements--possibly two battalions--will probably arrive in a week or so.]

[Reports of more direct threats to Prime Minister Adoula persist. Defense Minister Anany is said to be organizing for a coup attempt in March or April.]

[The exiled former Katangan President Tshombé is reported to be planning a convention in Madrid about the middle of February to form a popular front against the regime]

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*Communist China - Hong Kong: Peiping's recent offer to sell Hong Kong an additional 15 billion gallons of water per year from new mainland sources would solve the critical water shortage if accepted.

The Chinese proposal took the Hong Kong Government completely by surprise. It has expressed fears that there may be strings attached, but the offer was described as remarkably "altruistic" [redacted]

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The British chargé in Peiping has been called in to receive details of the plan, and a delegation from Hong Kong went to Canton on 30 January to discuss the project.

The Chinese Communists probably hope to score propaganda gains from the offer--whether accepted or not--which will support Peiping's efforts to reduce its political isolation by improving relations with free world countries.

A People's Daily editorial on 21 January provided the ideological rationale for cooperation with non-Communist states by explaining that even some capitalist countries had a common interest with China in opposing US "imperialist" exploitation.

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British Guiana: [The Progressive Youth Organization (PYO) of Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP) is planning a march on Georgetown which may lead to violence]

[Two teams of 12 PYO members are to leave from Georgetown today to drum up support in the back country for the march, which will pass through some predominantly Negro areas hostile to the East Indian - dominated PPP.]

[Both teams will hold "solidarity meetings" along the route, explain the "evils of proportional representation" to villagers, and invite them to join the march. The marchers expect to reach Georgetown on 8 or 9 February]

[Following the recent acts of arson and sabotage on the sugar estates--generally blamed on the PPP--the planned march will add to the increasing political and racial tensions in the colony]


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Rwanda-Burundi: [Armed clashes between Rwanda and Burundi may result from incursions of Rwandan refugees seeking to overthrow the Rwandan Government]

[Some 150,000 refugees located in the Congo, Tanganyika, and Uganda, as well as Burundi, are trying to restore their deposed king. They reportedly receive some financial assistance from Peiping]

[Rwanda suspects the Burundi Government of supporting the refugees, and some troops have pursued them across the border. Burundi, for its part, is already aroused by Rwanda's summary treatment of the refugees' fellow tribesmen in Rwanda, and is moving up troops to prevent any further Rwandan military incursions]

[Neither country can sustain extended military operations and they might appeal quickly for foreign help if a direct clash occurs. The Burundi radio has announced that Chou En-lai has accepted an invitation to visit Burundi during his current African trip.]

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NOTES

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OAS-Venezuela: [Venezuelan President Betancourt is apparently concerned that US support for strong OAS action on Venezuela's charges against Cuba may be weakening because of the opposition of Brazil, Mexico, and Chile to firm measures. He has urged that the US do everything possible to obtain a majority for new measures against Cuba, regardless of the desires of the "soft-line" group. Prior to the Panama affair, such a majority seemed probable.]

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Angola-Cuba: [Angolan rebel leader Holden Roberto, who recently announced his intention to expand his contacts with both Moscow and Peiping, apparently hopes to send a delegation to Cuba also.]

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Syria: The Baathist military regime in Damascus may be seeking a limited rapprochement with Nasir. The government is adopting a conciliatory line toward Syrian political refugees in Cairo and is considering cooperation with some pro-Nasirist groups in Syria. The regime is concerned over the shaky domestic political situation, and hopes to lessen its relative isolation from the rest of the Arab world.

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